Honesty and efficiency in the provision of expert services: doctors and other experts as participants in economic experiments. Experts serve us when we see the doctor, the financial planner or the car mechanic. In all these case the expert can take advantage of his superior knowledge and sell us something we do not need. This research will inform policy makers about the underlying motives of real world experts and allow them to design better institutions.
Games and decisions with bounded rationality: theory and economic implications. This project will develop concepts and tools for decision making in complex environments, where it is impossible to fully characterise the possible outcomes and factors that may affect them. A central goal will be to integrate heuristic rules such as the precautionary principle with the more formal approach adopted in benefit-cost analysis.
Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta stu ....Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta studies and stress tests. Expected outcomes of RDCE include a paradigm shift in game theory, resulting in broader acceptance and adoption of statistical game theory and to more robust policy recommendations.Read moreRead less
Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. T ....Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. This project concerns the design of alternative mechanisms that avoid these shortcomings and robustly deliver efficient and equitable outcomes. The project develops the theory underlying these novel mechanisms, tests them in a range of environments, and delivers an implementation for practical use.
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Introspection, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games: Theory and Experiment. Game theory is increasingly being used in the social sciences, but the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about its empirical relevance. This scepticism is reinforced by laboratory evidence showing behaviour patterns that are systematically biased away from game-theoretic predictions. This project concerns the development and testing of models more descriptive of actual huma ....Introspection, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games: Theory and Experiment. Game theory is increasingly being used in the social sciences, but the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about its empirical relevance. This scepticism is reinforced by laboratory evidence showing behaviour patterns that are systematically biased away from game-theoretic predictions. This project concerns the development and testing of models more descriptive of actual human behaviour. One aim is to deliver hybrid models able to reproduce interesting patterns of first-period play (introspection), time-series data in repeated games (learning), and systematic departures from static equilibrium. Another aim is to apply a successful hybrid to improve the design of economic and social institutions.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE210101085
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$323,692.00
Summary
Stability of Multilateral Agreements and the Limits to Cooperation. This project aims to analyze the stability of multilateral agreements. This is expected to be done by building upon the cooperative approach in game theory that focuses on groups as the primary decision makers. Moving the unit of analysis from an individual to a group has the advantage of widening the applicability of game theoretic methods to social issues. Consequently, the project is expected to enhance our understanding of h ....Stability of Multilateral Agreements and the Limits to Cooperation. This project aims to analyze the stability of multilateral agreements. This is expected to be done by building upon the cooperative approach in game theory that focuses on groups as the primary decision makers. Moving the unit of analysis from an individual to a group has the advantage of widening the applicability of game theoretic methods to social issues. Consequently, the project is expected to enhance our understanding of how and why cooperation can be sustained in some of the most pressing challenges faced by the society today that require extensive international collaboration to overcome, such as environmental change, trade disputes, and arms-control.
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Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the ....Information Quality in Auctions of Multiple Objects. This project aims at using both theory and laboratory experiments to analyse the formation of prices and the buyers' behaviour at auctions of multiple objects. The study focusses on the comparison of simultaneous auction procedures (in which the objects are sold at once) to sequential auction procedures (in which the objects are sold one after the other) and attention is drawn on the effects of the quality of the buyers' information about the assets to be sold on their bidding behaviour and on the seller's revenues. The conduct of laboratory experiments will provide a useful assessment of the theoretical predictions and valuable insights into the effects of buyers' information quality on their bidding behaviour at such markets.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE120102640
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$375,000.00
Summary
Behavioural foundations of economic design for an uncertain world. The aim of this project is to incorporate behavioural foundations into mechanism design to improve our understanding of economic institutions in incomplete information environments. To accomplish this goal, it considers a framework where agents have reference-dependent preferences and explores implications of this assumption for economic design.
The effect of bargaining power on bargaining outcomes: the roles of institutions, earned bargaining position and social norms. Previous research has found that people exploit their bargaining power far less than economic theories predict. This project uses an economics experiment to study several factors affecting how bargaining power is used: restrictions on the bargaining process; whether and how bargaining power is 'earned' and whether equal divisions are plausible.
Inductive game theory: experiential knowledge, interactions, and limited inferences in social contexts. This research project stresses the importance of limited experiences and limited inferential abilities for explaining differences observed across individuals and groups in society. The project will use inductive game theory to attack problems and conflicts between individuals and groups based on such limitations.