Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Price-Setting Rules and Allocative Efficiency in Oligopolies. This project aims to investigate under which circumstances restrictions on how often firms can change prices increase competition in an oligopoly and bring down prices. For this, we propose the use of laboratory experiments with a novel design followed by field experiments and a real price-data analysis for external validation. This study will result in both the advancement of theory describing how firms compete in dynamic oligopolies ....Price-Setting Rules and Allocative Efficiency in Oligopolies. This project aims to investigate under which circumstances restrictions on how often firms can change prices increase competition in an oligopoly and bring down prices. For this, we propose the use of laboratory experiments with a novel design followed by field experiments and a real price-data analysis for external validation. This study will result in both the advancement of theory describing how firms compete in dynamic oligopolies and practical policy advice on how price setting rules can be used to improve consumer welfare. This project has the potential to generate sizable benefits to Australian consumers, as the resulting policy advice would be applicable to large markets such as those for petrol, groceries and online retail.Read moreRead less
Wicked defaults: how to overcome the dark side of choice architecture. This project aims to investigate how defaults and product complexity might be used to exploit consumers in environments like private insurance where consumers are prone to making systematic errors. Defaults are used to nudge individuals into socially beneficial actions such as increasing their retirement savings and joining organ donor lists. However, in the hands of firms, defaults can also be used to exploit consumers by en ....Wicked defaults: how to overcome the dark side of choice architecture. This project aims to investigate how defaults and product complexity might be used to exploit consumers in environments like private insurance where consumers are prone to making systematic errors. Defaults are used to nudge individuals into socially beneficial actions such as increasing their retirement savings and joining organ donor lists. However, in the hands of firms, defaults can also be used to exploit consumers by encouraging choices that help the firm but disadvantage consumers. The project intends to study experimentally whether exploitation can be reduced via competition and reputation building systems based on consumer feedback.Read moreRead less