Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE170100340
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$311,000.00
Summary
Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mecha ....Competition in persuasion. This project aims to develop tools to analyse situations where multiple self-interested persuaders attempt to convince a set of listeners. It will build upon recent developments in the economics of persuasion literature, and apply tools from mechanism design literature. This approach, unlike other existing work, is not limited to specific settings and has the advantage of being highly tractable. Using these tools, this project intends to provide insights into the mechanisms behind grade inflation among universities, the optimal design of certification industries and information disclosure in clinical trials.Read moreRead less
Designing for uncertainty in conservation auctions. Economic theory and case study evidence show that tenders or auctions are more efficient than grant mechanisms for encouraging landholders to produce environmental outcomes on private land. These studies have ignored the effects of uncertainty of both bidders and administrators about factors such as landholder participation and the level of environmental benefits that will be delivered. This project will test whether distributing environmental ....Designing for uncertainty in conservation auctions. Economic theory and case study evidence show that tenders or auctions are more efficient than grant mechanisms for encouraging landholders to produce environmental outcomes on private land. These studies have ignored the effects of uncertainty of both bidders and administrators about factors such as landholder participation and the level of environmental benefits that will be delivered. This project will test whether distributing environmental funds via tenders is still efficient when uncertainty about various important factors is considered. Results from this research are expected to inform the cost effective design of systems to pay landholders for the provision of environmental benefits even when there is high uncertainty.Read moreRead less
A new approach to stability analysis for economic systems. This project will provide a new methodology for analysing stability in economic systems. By enhancing our understanding of stability and instability in markets for assets, credit, commodities and natural resources, this project will help economists forecast likely outcomes and improve the formulation of related economic policy.
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180101452
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$357,996.00
Summary
Strategic interaction with limited memory: A theoretical approach. This project aims to propose a theoretical framework that would allow economists to explore and uncover the behavioural and welfare effects of memory constraints. By integrating cognitive constraints into existing economic theory, this project is expected to enhance economists’ future capacity to inform a diverse range of economic policies. Incorporating cognitive constraints into economic research can reduce unintended conseque ....Strategic interaction with limited memory: A theoretical approach. This project aims to propose a theoretical framework that would allow economists to explore and uncover the behavioural and welfare effects of memory constraints. By integrating cognitive constraints into existing economic theory, this project is expected to enhance economists’ future capacity to inform a diverse range of economic policies. Incorporating cognitive constraints into economic research can reduce unintended consequences of policy recommendations and is especially important in in complex markets such as health or household finance.Read moreRead less
Economic efficiency and the provision of incentives for information acquisition and disclosure: a mechanism design approach. By uncovering what determines information acquisition, highlighting what allows experts and insiders to manipulate market outcomes, and studying the efficiency gains obtainable with the use of a variety of incentives schemes, this research will provide valuable insights for public policy concerning information diffusion and market transparency.
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE130101605
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$289,000.00
Summary
Composing machine learning via market mechanisms. This project aims to better understand connections between learning algorithms and markets as aggregators of information and develop new, principled techniques for combining predictions. This will improve our ability to construct systems that make predictions based on multiple, complex and structured sources of data.